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UNTELLECTUALPROPERTY 
KENDALL-JACKSON WINERY v. 
E. & J. GALLO WINERY 
150 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 1998) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Kendall-Jackson v. Gallo, l the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that grape leaf designs on 
wine bottles are not protected as trademarks under the Lan-
ham Trademark Act2 because of widespread use in the indus-
try. Accor~gly, the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's 
decision to grant Gallo's summary judgment motion in favor of 
Gallo.3 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Kendall-.Iackson Winery sued E. & J. Gallo in the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of California for 
trademark4 and trade dress:! violations, and for violating Cali-
1. 150 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 1998). The appeal from the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of California was argued and submitted on May 12, 
1998 before Circuit Judge Robert Boochever, Circuit Judge Herbert Y. C. Choy and 
Circuit Judge Harry Pregerson. The decision was med on July 8,1998. Circuit Judge 
Pregerson authored the opinion. 
2. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127. Generic marks are precluded from trademark 
registration. 
3. Kendall..Jackson Winery v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 150 F.3d 1042, 1049 (9th Cir. 
1998). 
4. 15 U.s.C. § 1127. A trademark is any word, name, symbol, or device or any 
combination thereof. 
5. See John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 7ll F.2d 966, 980 (llth Cir. 
1983). Trade dress is the total image of a product and may include features such as 
size, shape, color, color combinations, texture, or graphics. See id. 
122 
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fornia's unfair competition laws. 6 Kendall-Jackson claimed 
that Gallo infringed its trademark because the multicolored 
grape leaf design on Gallo's Turning Leaf label strongly resem-
bled the grape leaf design on its Vintner Reserve labels. 7 Ken-
dall-Jackson also argued that Gallo mimicked the overall ap-
pearance of its wine bottles. 8 
Kendall-Jackson began selling wines in 1983.9 By 1994, it 
was the number one chardonnay seller in the United States. 10 
6. See Kendall·Jackson, 150 F.3d at 1044. See CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE §17200. 
As used in this chapter, unfair competition shall mean any unlawful, unfair or 
fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading 
advertising and any act prohibited by Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 17500) of 
Part 3 of Division 7 of the Business and Professions Code. Cal Bus. & Prof. Code 
§17500 provides: 
Id. 
It is unlawful for any person, fIrm, corporation or association, or any employee 
thereof with intent directly or indirectly to dispose of real or personal property 
or to perform services, professional or otherwise, or anything of any nature 
whatsoever or to induce the public to enter into any obligation relating 
thereto, to make or disseminate or cause to be made or disseminated before 
the public in this state, or to make or disseminate or cause to be made or 
disseminated from this state before the public in any state, in any newspaper 
or other publication, or any advertising device, or by public outcry or 
proclamation, or in any other manner or means whatever, any statement, 
concerning such real or personal property or services, professional or 
otherwise, or concerning any circumstance or matter of fact connected with the 
proposed performance or disposition thereof, which is untrue or misleading, 
and which is known, or which by the exercise of reasonable care should be 
known, to be untrue or misleading, or for any such person, fIrm, or corporation 
to so make or disseminate or cause to be so made or disseminated any such 
statement as part of a plan or scheme with the intent not to sell such personal 
property or services, professional or otherwise, so advertised at the price 
stated therein, or as so advertised. Any violation of the provisions of this 
section is a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment in county jail not 
exceeding six months, or by a fme not exceeding two thousand fIve hundred 
dollars ($2,500), or by both. 
7. See Kendall·Jackson Winery, 150 F.3d at 1044. 
8. See id. Kendall·Jackson did more than use the leaf design to try to 
distinguish its Vintner's Reserve wine. It packaged the wine in recognizable bottles. 
The bottles came in one of two shapes ("burgundy-style" or "bordeaux-style"), had a 
rounded flange, a visible cork with printed leaves on it, a brown or burgundy neck label 
with gold lines, and an off-white label featuring the multicolored leaf design. See id. at 
1045. Kendall-Jackson also invoked the California and common-law counterparts to 
the Lanham Act, and asserted various unfair competition claims for trademark and 
trade dress dilution, false advertising, unfair competition, common law trademark 
infringement, common law trade dress infringement and palming off. See id. at 1045-
46. 
9. See id. at 1045. 
10. See id. By 1994, Kendall-Jackson annually sold over $100 million worth of its 
Vintner Reserve wine. See id. 
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Kendall,Tackson's Vintner Reserve label featured a downward 
pointing, grape leaf in different shades of green, yellow, orange, 
red and brown. ll The bottles were characterized by a rounded 
lip at the top of the bottleneck, called a "flange," a neck label 
with gold lines near the top and bottom, and an off-white label 
displaying the multicolored leaf design. 12 
In 1995, Gallo, the world's largest wine-producer,13 intro-
duced a line of premium wine called Turning Leaf. 14 Turning 
Leaf was the result of three years of market research. 15 The 
Turning Leaf label featured a grape leaf motif and omitted 
Gallo's name.16 Gallo's Turning Leaf bottles displayed a label 
that closely resembled Kendall,Tackson's Vintner Reserve la-
bel. 17 These characteristics included a grape leaf design in dif-
ferent shades of green, yellow, orange, red and brown. 18 The 
Turning Leaf bottle itself was also similar in appearance to 
Kendall,Tackson's Vintner Reserve bottle. 19 Like the Vintner 
Reserve bottle, Turning Leafs bottle was characterized by a 
rounded lip at the top of the bottle neck, a neck label with gold 
lines near the top and bottom, and an off-white label displaying 
the multicolored leaf design. 20 
Kendall,Tackson sued Gallo six months after the Turning 
Leaf line was introduced.21 The district court granted Gallo's 
motion for summary judgment on the trademark claim22 and 
11. See it:l. 
12. See Kendall-Jackson, 150 F.3d at 1045. 
13. See it:l. See also Gallo Stands at Top of International Wineries, THE KOREA 
HERALD, March 16, 1998. 
14. See it:l. 
15. See Kendall-Jackson, 150 F.3d at 1045. Gallo's research indicated that the 
name "Gallo" was associated with "jug wine" and that a multicolored grape leaf design 
attracted wine drinkers. See it:l. 
16. See it:l. 
17. See it:l. 
18. See it:l. 
19. See Kendall-Jackson, 150 F.3d at 1045. 
20. See it:l. 
21. See it:l. See also Kendall-Jackson Winery v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, No. C-96-
1198-VRW, 1998 WL 337568 (N.D. Cal. 1997). 
22. See Kendall-Jackson, 150 F.3d at 1048. The district court decided that no 
reasonable jury could conclude from the evidence that consumers associate the colored 
grape leaf design with Kendall-Jackson. See Kendall-Jackson, No. C-96-1198-VRW, 
1998 WL 337568. 
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denied its motion for summary judgment on the trade dress 
claim.23 On April 3, 1997, a jury found that Gallo did not in-
fringe on Kendall-J ackson's trade dress. 24 On June 4, 1997, the 
district court denied Kendall-Jackson's motion for a new trial. 25 
The district court entered judgment in favor of Gallo on all re-
maining federal and state law claims.26 Kendall-Jackson ap-
pealed.27 
III. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A THE TRADEMARK ISSUE 
The Ninth Circuit first addressed the question of whether 
Kendall-Jackson's grape leaf design was an inherently distinc-
tive trademark. The court applied the Imagination Test28 to 
conclude that the use of a grape leaf design for wine was inher-
ently distinctive29 because it suggested rather than described 
the product.30 Under the Imagination Test, a trademark is 
suggestive rather than descriptive if a consumer has to use 
more than a small amount of imagination to make the associa-
tion between the mark and the product.31 The Ninth Circuit 
reasoned that since a grape leaf comes from a grapevine, a 
23. See Kendall-Jackson, 150 F.3d at 1046. See also Kendall-Jackson, No. C-96-
1198-VRW, 1998 WL 337568. The district court decided that there was a genuine issue 
of material fact on the trade dress issue. 
24. See Kendall-Jackson, 150 F.3d at 1046, 1050. See also Kendall-Jackson, No. 
C-96-1198-VRW, 1998 WL 337568. 
25. See id. 
26. See Kendall-Jackson, 150 F.3d at 1046. The district court also denied Gallo's 
motion for leave to file a counterclaim on June 6, 1997. Kendall-Jackson appealed the 
district court's decision, which the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 
27. See id. 
28. See id. at 1048-49. The Imagination Test is met if one must take steps to 
associate the grape leaf with the product. See also Rodeo Collection v. West Seventh, 
812 F.2d 1215, 1218 (9th Cir. 1987). 
29. See Kendall-.1ackson Winery v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 150 F.3d 1042, 1048 (9th 
Cir. 1998). In its appeal from the district court on the trademark issue, Kendall-
Jackson argued that a reasonable jury could have found the colored grape leaf design 
inherently distinctive because consumers associate the design with Kendall-.1ackson. 
The Ninth Circuit held that a grape leaf design has become a generic emblem for wine 
and, therefore, is not entitled to trademark protection. 
30. See Kendall-Jackson, 150 F.3d at 1048. 
31. See Rodeo Collection v. West Seventh, 812 F.2d 1215, 1218 (9th Cir. 1987). 
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grapevine has grapes and grapes produce wine, the design was 
suggestive of the product. 32 
The Ninth Circuit also held, however, that Kendall-
Jackson's grape leaf design on a wine bottle was merely a ge-
neric mark.33 By applying the Widespread Use Test,3. the court 
found that the grape leaf design was no longer inherently dis-
tinctive because wine producers have decorated their labels 
with this design for many years.35 Therefore, grape leaf de-
signs are analogous to aspirin; 36 a term so common it could 
never be protected.37 The court reasoned that like the term as-
pirin, the grape leaf design had lost the ability to differentiate 
brands in the minds of consumers because of its widespread 
use.38 
The Ninth Circuit stated, however, that a particular grape 
leaf design may be so distinctive as to warrant protection from 
copying.39 Therefore, the court evaluated Gallo's and Kendall-
Jackson's designs in their entireties.4° The Ninth Circuit de-
termined that Kendall-Jackson's particular rendering of a 
grape leaf was not unique enough to allow the consumer to dis-
32. See Kendall-Jackson, 150 F.3d at 1049. 
33. See id. 
34. See id. See also SUSAN UPTON DOUGLASS & BARBARA A. SOLOMAN, OVERVIEW 
OF BASIC PRINCIPLES OF TRADEMARK LAW (Practising Law Institute, 1990). For the 
Widespread Use Test, several federal courts ask to what extent have other sellers used 
the mark for similar goods. See id. 
35. See Kendall-Jackson, 150 F.3d at 1049. 
36. [d. 
37. See Boston Beer v. Slesar Bros. Brewing, 9 F.3d 175, 180 (lst Cir. 1993). See 
also Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921). 
38. See Kendall-Jackson, 150 F.3d at 1049. 
39. See id. 
40. See id. The Ninth Circuit evaluated several factors. For example, whether 
Kendall..Jackson's grape leaf design was more like a photo or a stylized rendering, 
what parts of Kendall..Jackson's design were more distinctive and less distinctive, 
whether Gallo depicted its name in the same area of the design that Kendall..Jackson 
did, what characteristics Gallo's leaf shared with Kendall-Jackson's, and the similarity 
in the intensity of coloration. 
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tinguish it from other brands of wine.41 The court denied Ken-
dall..Jackson's appeal on the trademark infringement claim.42 
B. THE TRADE DRESS ISSUE 
With respect to the trade dress claim, the Ninth Circuit held 
that the district ccurt did not erroneously submit this issue to 
the jury.43 Kendall..Jackson argued that, at most, Gallo's evi-
dence showed that a flanged bottle is functional and that some 
wineries use leaf designs on their bottles. 44 Kendall..J ackson 
contended, however, that Gallo failed to show that Kendall-
Jackson's trade dress as a whole was either functional or non-
distinctive. 45 
The Ninth Circuit disagreed.46 The court found that Gallo's 
evidence showed that the combination of Kendall..Jackson's 
exposed cork, rounded flange, and neck label merely repre-
sented the "California look," which consumers expect from a 
California wine. 47 The Ninth Circuit noted that a reasonable 
jury could find these features as constituting part of Kendall-
Jackson's trade dress.48 However, the court refrained from 
granting Kendall..Jackson exclusive use of this combination of 
features because it would put competitors at a significant "non-
reputation related" disadvantage.49 
Thus, the court concluded that Kendall..Jackson's trade 
dress was functional. 50 The Court also noted that a jury could 
';0 
41. See id. 
42. See id. Kendall-Jackson presented no triable issue of fact regarding the 
distinctiveness of its grape leaf design in relation to other wineries. See id. 
43. See Kendall-Jackson, 150 F.3d at 1050. The court concluded that Kendall-
Jackson failed to establish its trade dress was non-functional and distinctive as a 
matter oflaw. See id. 
44. See id. 
45. See id. 
46. See id. 
47. See id. 
48. See Kendall-Jackson, 150 F.3d at 1050. 
49. See Qualitex v. Jacobson Products, 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995). 
50. See Kendall-Jackson, 150 F.3d at 1050-51. A product feature is functional if it 
is essential to the use or purpose ofthe product. See id. at 1048. See also Qualitex, 524 
U.S. at 164. "The functionality doctrine prevents trademark law, which seeks to 
6
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reasonably conclude that the "California look" was generic or 
descriptive and, therefore, nondistinctive. 51 
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF DECISION 
The Ninth Circuit's approach indicates that, in the absence 
of a uniform test for distinctiveness, certain distinctions among 
trademark classifications become muddled. 52 The United 
States Supreme Court has analyzed distinctiveness by dividing 
trademarks and trade dress into five categories of generally 
increasing distinctiveness. 53 These included (1) generic,54 (2) 
descriptive,55 (3) suggestive/a (4) arbitrary/7 or (5) fanciful. 58 
promote competition by protecting a firm's reputation, from instead inhibiting 
legitimate competition by allowing a producer to control a useful product feature." Id. 
51. See Kendall·Jackson, 150 F.3d at 1051. Regarding likelihood of confusion, 
Kendall.Jackson argued that the district court's jury instructions failed in two ways. 
First, the district court did not instruct the jury that Gallo's intent to exploit Kendall-
Jackson's mark creates a rebuttable presumption of confusion. Second, the district 
court's instructions did not accurately define actual confusion. See id. The Ninth 
Circuit rejected both arguments, including the district court's failure to instruct on the 
rebuttable presumption. See id at 1051-52. The Ninth Circuit held that the district 
court's jury instructions on actual confusion were not erroneous because when read in 
context, although there was some risk of ambiguity, it did not believe that the jury 
could have been misled. See id. at 1052. In sum, the Ninth Circuit determined that 
the jury was properly allowed to decide the trade dress claim because there were 
genuine issues of material fact. See id. 
52. See Michele A. Sheptner, Note, Determining a Proper Test for Inherent 
Distinctiveness in Trade Dress, 8 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 947, 1007 
(1998). This author proposes a new test for inherent distinctiveness in trade dress 
claims because of the "sheer number and variety of differing tests and criteria." Id. 
See also Andrew A. Smith, Comment, Trademark Law: Equity's Role in Unfair 
Competition Cases, 13 U. HAW. L. REV. 137, 173 (1991). This author suggests that the 
inherent distinctiveness doctrine is "strictly illusory," due to its similarity with the 
secondary meaning concept. Id. Both inherent distinctiveness and secondary meaning 
require that the trademark or trade dress proponent show that his product indicates 
origin before it will be protected under the Lanham Act. See id. See also Stephen R. 
Baird, Note, pUtting the Cart before the Horse in Assessing Trademark Validity-
Toward Redefining the Inherently Generic Term, 14 J. CORP. L. 925 (1989). 
53. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992). 
54. George K. Chamberlin, Annotation, When does product mark become generic 
term or "common descriptive namen so as to warrant cancellation of registration of 
mark, pursuant to § 14 of Lanham Act (§ 15 U.S.C.A. 1064), 55 A.L.R. FED. 241, 243 
(1981). A generic name refers to a genus of which a particular product is a species. See 
also Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 768. Generic marks may not be registered as trademarks 
and are not protected by the Lanham Act. See id. 
55. See In re DC Comics, 689 F.2d 1042, 1044 (C.C.P.A. 1982). Words or images 
are descriptive of a particular product when its use conveys, to one who is unfamiliar 
with the product, its functions or qualities. See also Kendall.Jackson Winery v. E. & J. 
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Typically, in trademark litigation, difficulties determining the 
distinctiveness of a mark center on the descriptive-suggestive 
borderline. 59 The Ninth Circuit noted this difficulty in its prior 
Gallo Winery, 150 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 1998). Descriptive marks mayor may not 
be protected by the Lanham Act. If the public comes to associate the descriptive mark 
with a specific source, it has acquired distinctiveness. See id. This acquired 
distinctiveness is referred to as secondary meaning. See id. Trademarks that have 
secondary meaning qualifY for protection under the Lanham Act. See id. See also Two 
Pesos, 505 U.S. at 769. Descriptive marks that do not identifY a particular source, but 
merely describe a product,· are not distinctive and may not be registered or protected 
under the Lanham Act. See id. For example, the name "beer" may not be registered as 
a trademark because it describes a product and does not inherently identifY a 
particular source. See Boston Beer Co. v. Slesar Bros. Brewing Co., 9 F.3d 175 (lst Cir. 
1993). 
56. See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 768. Because suggestive, arbitrary, and fanciful 
trademarks by their intrinsic nature serve to identifY a particular source of a product, 
they are deemed inherently distinctive. See id. 
57. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
58. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
·59. 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 11:22 (1996). See also Committee for Idaho's High Desert, Inc. v. Yost, 
92 F.3d 814, 818 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting the difficulty in drawing the line between 
suggestive and descriptive marks). See also Self·Realization Fellowship Church v. 
Ananda Church of Self-Realization, 59 F.3d 902, 911 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding the 
distinction between descriptive and suggestive marks may be inarticulable). See also 
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 973 F.2d 1033, 1040 (9th Cir. 1992). 
In Bristol-Meyers the main issue on appeal was whether the term "PM" when applied 
to an analgesic/sleep aid was descriptive or suggestive of the product. The Ninth 
Circuit agreed with the district court's determination that the "PM" mark was 
descriptive. It noted, "[a)lthough the line between descriptive and suggestive may be 
difficult to discern, [ ), the consequence of the classification is important." Id. A 
descriptive term is protected under the Lanham Act only if the proponent of protection 
demonstrates that, in addition to the common meaning of the word or words, the term 
has acquired secondary meaning in its particular market. In contrast, if its mark is 
suggestive, a plaintiff need not prove such secondary meaning in order to qualifY for 
protection. See id. See also Surgicenters of America, Inc. v. Medical Dental Surgeries, 
Co., 601 F.2d 1011, 1014 (9th Cir. 1979). In Surgicenters, the Ninth Circuit agreed 
with the district court that the lines of demarcation between generic, descriptive, 
suggestive, arbitrary and fanciful are not always clear "and the entire area of trade or 
service marks is fraught with difficulties and ambiguities." Id. See also Abercrombie 
& Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 10 (2nd Cir. 1976) ("Having created the 
[suggestive) category the courts have had great difficulty in defining it. Judge Learned 
Hand made the not very helpful statement: It is quite impossible to get any rule out of 
the cases beyond this: That the validity of the mark ends where suggestion ends and 
description begins"). 
8
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decisions. 60 Confusion is understandable under current trade-
mark law.61 
The Kendall-Jackson opinion suggests that when ther~ is a 
question as to whether a trademark or trade dress is distinctive 
in the Ninth Circuit, the proper focus should be on the extent 
other sellers have used the mark for similar goods.62 Therefore, 
future courts should acknowledge that normally-distinctive 
marks may lose their protected status under the Lanham 
Trademark Act simply because they are widely used. 
Rema M. Titcomb· 
60. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
61. See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 769. For example, descriptive marks can acquire 
distinctiveness and eventual trademark protection through the theory of secondary 
meaning. See id. See also supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
62. See Kerulall-Jackson, 150 F.3d at 1049. 
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 2000. 
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